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Abstract
Commitment in monetary policy leads to equilibria that are superior to those
from optimal discretionary policies. A number of interest rate reaction functions
and instrument rules have been proposed to implement or approximate commit-
ment policy. We assess these rules in terms of whether they lead to a rational
expectations equilibrium that is both locally determinate and stable under adap-
tive learning by private agents. A reaction function that appropriately depends
explicitly on private sector expectations performs particularly well on both counts.
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1 Introduction
Many recent models of monetary policy emphasize the importance of forward looking
aspects of the economy, in which expectations of private agents significantly influence
the economic outcome. If expectations about the future are part of the equilibrating
mechanisms in the economy it is well known that standard intertemporal optimization
of economic policy by the government is in general subject to the problem of time in-
consistency, so that a policymaker has incentives to deviate, in later periods, from the
optimal plan obtained in the first period. In contrast, discretionary policies are obtained
through policy optimization separately in each period and are time consistent, but typ-
ically the resulting sequence of discretionary policy decisions will not lead to the overall
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intertemporal optimum. The losses from discretionary policies can be quantitatively
significant, and this has provided the impetus for finding ways to achieve the optimum
or at least to improve the outcome.
While earlier papers on time consistency focused on the inflation bias in monetary
policy, recent work has shown that even if inflation bias does not arise under appropriate
goals of the policymaker, the issue of commitment vs. discretion still obtains. Discretion
leads to what is called a “stabilization bias” and there are gains to commitment, see
(Woodford 1999a), (Woodford 1999b), (Svensson and Woodford 2005), (McCallum and
Nelson 2004) and (Clarida, Gali, and Gertler 1999).
(Woodford 1999a) and (Woodford 1999b) suggest that monetary policy making ought
be based on the timeless perspective. This concept is a rule-based policy that is obtained
by respecting the optimality conditions from the full intertemporal optimization under
commitment, except for the current decision-making period. In other words, the policy-
maker follows “the pattern of behavior to which it would have wished to commit itself
at a date far in the past” (p.293 in (Woodford 1999a)). The gains from committing to
this policy, relative to the discretionary policies, can be significant, see (McCallum and
Nelson 2004). In this paper we adopt the timeless perspective formulation and refer to
the corresponding optimal monetary policy as the “commitment solution.”
Most of the recent literature on monetary policy, including all of the references above,
has been conducted under the hypothesis of rational expectations (RE). However, this
may not be an innocuous assumption as shown by (Bullard and Mitra 2002) and (Evans
and Honkapohja 2003b). The assumption of RE should not be taken for granted, since
expectations can be out of equilibrium, at least for a period of time, as a result of
exogenous events such as structural shifts in the economy. Economic policies should be
designed to avoid instabilities that can arise from expectational errors and the corrective
behavior of economic agents in the face of such errors.
The issue of temporary errors in forecasting, and the consequent correction mecha-
nisms, have been widely studied in recent research using the adaptive learning approach.1
(Bullard and Mitra 2002) consider the stability of equilibria when monetary policy is
conducted using some variant of the Taylor interest-rate rule and argue that monetary
policy making should take into account the constraints on the policy parameters im-
plied by learnability. (Evans and Honkapohja 2003b) show that certain standard forms
of optimal discretionary interest-rate setting by the central bank lead to instability as
economic agents unsuccessfully try to correct their forecast functions over time so that
the economy fails to converge to the desired rational expectations equilibrium (REE).
We propose an alternative way to implement optimal discretionary policy that always
leads to stability under learning.2
The research on adaptive learning and monetary policy has so far focused on the per-
formance of discretionary optimal policies or ad hoc interest-rate rules. This paper takes
up optimal policy under commitment and studies whether this facilitates convergence
1(Evans and Honkapohja 2001) is a treatise on adaptive learning and its macroeconomic implications.
(Evans and Honkapohja 1999), (Marimon 1997), and (Sargent 1993) are surveys of the field.
2The literature on learning and monetary policy is surveyed in (Evans and Honkapohja 2003a).
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of private expectations to the optimal REE. On intuitive grounds one might think that
commitment favors stability under learning by leading to more forecastable dynamics
than when policy is re-optimized every period. We argue that while this can indeed
be the case, stability depends critically on the way the policy is implemented. Certain
standard forms of central bank reaction functions do not or do not always provide sta-
bility under learning. However, there is another implementation, depending explicitly
on private expectations, that always performs well in this respect.
A related concern addressed by (Bernanke and Woodford 1997), (Woodford 1999b),
(Svensson and Woodford 2005) and others is that it is desirable for policy rules to yield
determinacy, i.e. locally unique REE, to ensure that there are no nearby suboptimal
REE. We show that for all parameter values our proposed “expectations-based” rule
satisfies the dual criteria of determinacy and stability under learning.
2 The Model
We use a linearized model that is very commonly employed in the literature, see (Clarida,
Gali, and Gertler 1999) for this particular formulation and references to the literature.
The original nonlinear framework is based on a representative consumer, a continuum
of firms producing diﬀerentiated goods under monopolistic competition and subject to
constraints on the frequency of price changes, as originally suggested by (Calvo 1983).
The behavior of the private sector is described by two equations
xt = −ϕ(it −E∗t πt+1) + E∗t xt+1 + gt, (1)
which is the “IS” curve derived from the Euler equation for consumer optimization, and
πt = λxt + βE∗t πt+1 + ut, (2)
which is the price-setting rule for the monopolistically competitive firms. Appendix
A.1.1 discusses further the interpretation of (1) and (2).
Here xt and πt denote the output gap and inflation for period t, respectively. it is the
nominal interest rate, expressed as the deviation from the steady state real interest rate.
The determination of it will be discussed below. E∗t xt+1 and E
∗
t πt+1 denote the private
sector expectations of the output gap and inflation next period. Since our focus is on
learning behavior, these expectations need not be rational (Et without ∗ denotes RE).
The parameters ϕ and λ are positive and β is the discount factor so that 0 < β < 1.
The shocks gt and ut are assumed to be observable and followµ
gt
ut
¶
= F
µ
gt−1
ut−1
¶
+
µ
g˜t
u˜t
¶
, where F =
µ
µ 0
0 ρ
¶
, (3)
0 < |µ| , |ρ| < 1, and g˜t ∼ iid(0, σ2g), u˜t ∼ iid(0, σ2u) are independent white noise.
gt represents shocks to government purchases and/or potential output. ut represents
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any cost-push shocks to marginal costs other than those entering through xt.3 The ut
shock is important for policy issues since the gt shock can be fully oﬀset by appropriate
interest-rate setting. µ and ρ are assumed known (if not, they could be estimated).
Assume RE for the moment. Monetary policy is derived from minimization of a
quadratic loss function
Et
∞X
s=0
βs(π2t+s + αx
2
t+s). (4)
This type of optimal policy is often called “flexible inflation targeting” in the current
literature, see e.g. (Svensson 1999) and (Svensson 2003). α is the relative weight on
the output target and pure inflation targeting would be the case α = 0. Note that,
first, the policymaker is assumed to have the same discount factor as the private sector
and, second, the target value of the output gap is set at zero implying that the classical
problem of inflation bias does not arise. For brevity, the inflation target is also set at
zero (introducing non-zero targets would not change the conclusions of our analysis).
We treat the policymaker’s preferences as exogenously given. It is also well known, see
(Rotemberg and Woodford 1999), that the quadratic loss function (4) can be viewed as
an approximation of the utility function of the representative consumer.4
The full intertemporal optimum under RE, usually called the commitment solution,
is obtained by maximizing (4) subject to (2) for all periods t, t + 1, t + 2, . . . The first
order conditions are written as
λπt = −αxt, (5)
λπt+s = −α(xt+s − xt+s−1), (6)
for s = 1, 2, 3, . . .. The time inconsistency of the commitment solution is evident from
(5), since this places a requirement that is specific to the current period and is diﬀerent
from the corresponding requirement (6) for later periods.
As noted in the Introduction, the timeless perspective resolution to the problem
of the time inconsistency of optimal policy is that the policymaker should respect the
optimality conditions above, except for the current period when the optimization is done.
In our context this amounts to using (6) also for the current period (and neglecting (5)).
This yields the commitment optimality condition5
λπt = −α(xt − xt−1). (7)
We remark that (7) is sometimes called a “specific targeting rule” in the literature.
3For possible interpretations of the ut shock, see (Clarida, Gali, and Gertler 1999), (Erceg, Hender-
son, and Levin 2000) and (Woodford 2003), Chapter 6.
4Like much of the literature on monetary policy, we do not explicitly introduce the budget constraint
of the government. This is justified by assuming that fiscal policy is set “passively” in the sense of
(Leeper 1991) and ensures that the intertemporal budget constraint of the government is satisfied.
5(Clarida, Gali, and Gertler 1999), p.1681, (McCallum and Nelson 2004), (Woodford 1999b), Section
3.1 and (Woodford 1999a), appendix present this optimality condition.
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We next compute the REE of interest. It can be shown that the dynamic system in
xt and πt defined by (2) and (7) has a unique nonexplosive RE solution. This solution
can be expressed as a linear function of the state variables xt−1 and ut and is known as
the “minimal state variable” (MSV) solution (see (McCallum 1983)). To obtain it one
uses the method of undetermined coeﬃcients, expressing the REE as
xt = bxxt−1 + cxut, (8)
πt = bπxt−1 + cπut. (9)
As shown by (McCallum and Nelson 2004), imposing RE implies that bx must satisfy
βb2x − γbx + 1 = 0,
where γ = 1 + β + λ2/α. This has two solutions, but the one of interest is6
b¯x = (2β)−1[γ − (γ2 − 4β)1/2]. (10)
This delivers a stationary REE for all values of structural parameters, since 0 < b¯x < 1,
and corresponds to the policy optimum. The other coeﬃcients are
b¯π = (α/λ)(1− b¯x), c¯x = −[λ + βb¯π + (1− βρ)(α/λ)]−1, c¯π = −(α/λ)c¯x.
We will refer to this REE as the optimal REE.
3 Optimal Interest-Rate Setting
Thus far we have formulated the concept of optimal monetary policy under RE and
reviewed the derivation of the corresponding REE using the existing literature. This
derivation did not rely on the aggregate demand curve (1), which depends on the interest
rate and which can be used to determine the interest rate that implements the desired
optimal equilibrium. Computation of the appropriate interest rate leads to a functional
relationship that is often called a reaction function, since the optimality condition (7) will
be exactly met. Interest-rate rules that respond to endogenous and exogenous variables,
but do not respect (7), are instead called instrument rules and we will analyze some
instrument rules below in Section 5.7
As has become apparent from the earlier literature (see the references below), interest-
rate setting in the form of a reaction function can be implemented in diﬀerent ways
depending on what is assumed to be known in the policy optimization. In this paper we
consider several possibilities, extending the analysis in (Evans and Honkapohja 2003b)
for discretionary policy. For each reaction function we test its performance in two ways.
6The other root for bx is always larger than one and therefore generates explosive time paths.
7Our terminology largely agrees with that of (Svensson and Woodford 2005) and (Svensson 2003).
They call the optimality condition (7) a “specific targeting rule” and the setting of the interest rate
instrument, with (7) satisfied, a “reaction function” of the policy maker.
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First, we will determine if the resulting REE is determinate. This means that it is
the unique stationary REE under the reaction function. If a solution is indeterminate
there exist other stationary RE solutions nearby and, as is well known, these can include
a dependence on extraneous variables or “sunspots.” Second, we determine whether the
REE corresponding to the reaction function implementing optimal policy is stable under
adaptive learning by private agents. Here we formally analyze whether the RE solution
is E-stable, since E-stability is known to determine whether the solution is locally stable
if private agents update their forecasts using least squares or closely related learning
schemes. We remark that these are independent criteria. Our aim is to look for reaction
functions for the interest rate that induce both determinacy and stability under learning.
3.1 The Fundamentals-Based Reaction Function
A possible interest-rate rule to implement the optimal REE is obtained by computing
Etπt+1 = b¯π b¯xxt−1 + (b¯π c¯x + c¯πρ)ut,
Etxt+1 = b¯2xxt−1 + (b¯x + ρ)c¯xut,
inserting these expectations and (8) into (1), and solving for the interest rate:
it = ψxxt−1 + ψggt + ψuut, (11)
where
ψx = b¯x[ϕ
−1(b¯x − 1) + b¯π], ψg = ϕ−1,
ψu = [b¯π + ϕ
−1(b¯x + ρ− 1)]c¯x + c¯πρ.
We refer to (11) as the fundamentals-based reaction function, since its derivation is based
solely on the model (1) and (2), the optimality condition (7) and the assumption that the
economy is in a stationary REE. The corresponding reaction function under discretion
is identical, except that ψx = 0. Comparing discretion to (11) we see that the former is
an open-loop policy whereas (11) has a feedback from lagged endogenous variables.
We emphasize that the derivation of this interest-rate rule presupposes RE on the
part of both the private agents and the policymaker. The dependence on lagged output
gap reflects the commitment aspect of the optimal policy. We note that interest-rate
setting according to (11) is quite similar to the “reaction functions” in equation (2.30) in
(Svensson and Woodford 2005) and (3.5) in (Svensson 2003). Their models diﬀer from
the model in this paper, but the setting of interest rates according to lagged output and
observable exogenous variables is the key common feature for their setups and (11).8
We now analyze the model with interest-rate rule (11) for determinacy and stability
under learning. For this purpose, combining (1), (2) and (11), we write the reduced form
8Our model does not include the unobservable judgement variables that are introduced in (Svensson
2003) to capture further model uncertainties.
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of the model in terms of general (possibly non-rational) expectations asµ
xt
πt
¶
=
µ
1 ϕ
λ β + λϕ
¶µ
E∗t xt+1
E∗t πt+1
¶
+ (12)µ
−ϕψx 0
−λϕψx 0
¶µ
xt−1
πt−1
¶
+
µ
−ϕψu
1− λϕψu
¶
ut.
3.1.1 Does the Fundamentals-Based Reaction Function Yield Determinacy?
To analyze determinacy, we apply well-known methodology, see e.g. the Appendix of
Chapter 10 of (Evans and Honkapohja 2001). The basic steps are to rewrite the model
in first-order form and to compare the number of non-predetermined variables with the
number of eigenvalues of the forward-looking matrix that lie inside the unit circle. When
these numbers are equal the model is determinate and has a unique nonexplosive solution.
Intuitively, each root inside the unit circle provides a side condition that ties down one
non-predetermined variable. If there are fewer eigenvalues inside the unit circle than
non-predetermined variables then the model is indeterminate and there exist multiple
nonexplosive solutions. In particular, in the indeterminate case there exist multiple
stationary solutions that depend on sunspot variables. In contrast to the optimal REE,
these other REE will not satisfy (7), the necessary conditions for an optimum.9
Whether the determinacy condition holds depends on the structural parameters:
Proposition 1 Under the fundamentals-based reaction function there are parameter re-
gions in which the model is determinate and other regions in which it is indeterminate.
As an illustration we consider three diﬀerent calibrations found in the literature.10
Calibration W: β = 0.99, ϕ = (0.157)−1 and λ = 0.024.
Calibration CGG: β = 0.99, ϕ = 4 and λ = 0.075.
Calibration MN: β = 0.99, ϕ = 0.164 and λ = 0.3.
These are taken, respectively, from (Woodford 1999b), (Clarida, Gali, and Gertler 2000)
and (McCallum and Nelson 1999). Straightforward numerical calculations show that for
small values of α the steady state is indeterminate, while for larger values of α the model
is determinate. (With the calibrated parameter values the borderlines are approximately
α = 0.16, 0.47 and 278, for the three calibrations.) Determinacy thus arises only for
some values of α. The domain of values for α that gives determinacy depends sensitively
9Other stationary REE that satisfy (2) cannot satisfy (7) because, as previously noted, the system
(2) and (7) has a unique stationary RE solution.
10Both the (Clarida, Gali, and Gertler 2000) and (Woodford 1999b) calibrations are for quarterly
data. However, (Woodford 1999b) uses quarterly interest rates and measures inflation as quarterly
changes in the log price level, while (Clarida, Gali, and Gertler 2000) use annualized rates for both
variables. We adopt the Woodford measurement convention, and therefore our CGG calibration divides
by 4 both the σ and κ values reported by (Clarida, Gali, and Gertler 2000).
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on the calibration, but in general suﬃcient flexibility in inflation targeting is needed to
ensure determinacy of equilibrium under the reaction function (11).
We remark that we are treating α as a free policy preference parameter as is often
done in the applied literature. If instead (4) is obtained as an approximation to the
welfare of the representative consumer, α, ϕ and λ all depend on deep preference and
price setting parameters. Because there are more than three deep structural parameters
however, there are degrees of freedom for α given β, ϕ and λ.11
3.1.2 Learning Instability with the Fundamentals-Based Reaction Function
Derivation of the interest-rate reaction function (11) presupposed that economic agents
in the model have RE. However, suppose now that private agents have possibly non-
rational expectations, which they try to correct through adaptive learning. We assume
that the policymaker does not explicitly take this private agent learning into account,
and continues to set policy according to (11). We are thus analyzing whether, under
(11), the optimal REE is robust to transient errors in forecasting by private agents.
We employ the standard methodology of adaptive learning (see footnote 1 for ref-
erences). The system under adaptive learning, more specifically under least squares
learning, and stability of an REE under learning are formulated as follows.
The central assumption is that at each period t private agents have a perceived law
of motion (PLM) that they use to make forecasts. In vector notation the PLM is
yt = at + btyt−1 + ctvt, where yt =
µ
xt
πt
¶
, vt =
µ
gt
ut
¶
. (13)
The parameters (at, bt, ct) are updated over time using least squares. (This updating
might for example be done by an econometric forecasting firm that supplies forecasts to
the agents). Note that for the reduced form (12) the optimal REE can be written as
yt = a¯+ b¯yt−1 + c¯vt,
where a¯ = 0 and where the second column of b¯ is zero. The PLM (13) has the same
form as this REE, but in general (at, bt, ct) need not equal the REE values (0, b¯, c¯).
Given the PLM and the current value of vt, the forecast functions of the private
agents are E∗t yt+1 = at + btE
∗
t yt + ctE
∗
t vt+1 or
E∗t yt+1 = at + bt(at + btyt−1 + ctvt) + ctFvt, (14)
where (at, bt, ct) are the parameter values of the forecasts functions that agents have
estimated on the basis of past data up to and including period t − 1. Note that we
are assuming that current exogenous variables, and lagged but not current endogenous
variables, are in the information set when forecasts are made. This is in line with much
11In (Rotemberg and Woodford 1999) ϕ is determined by a parameter of the utility function for
aggregate consumption. α and λ depend on this and two other preference parameters as well independent
price setting parameters. Analysis of the feasible range of (α,ϕ, λ) would require a separate study.
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of the literature. At certain points in the text we will consider an alternative information
assumption in which expectations depend on current endogenous variables.
These forecasts are used in decisions for period t, which yields the temporary equilib-
rium, also called the actual law of motion (ALM), for yt = (xt, πt) with the given PLM.
The temporary equilibrium or ALM provides a new data point and agents are then as-
sumed to re-estimate the parameters (at, bt, ct) with data through period t and use the
updated forecast functions for period t + 1 decisions. Together with vt+1 these in turn
yield the temporary equilibrium for period t + 1 and the learning dynamics continues
with the same steps in subsequent periods. The REE (0, b¯, c¯) is said to be stable under
learning if the sequence (at, bt, ct) converges to (0, b¯, c¯) over time.
Appendix A.1.2 gives the stability conditions for convergence to an REE under least
squares learning. The central idea is to obtain a mapping T from the PLM parameters
(a, b, c) to the implied ALM parameters, T (a, b, c). The REE corresponds to a fixed
point of this map and one can define a stability condition, known as E-stability, in terms
of a diﬀerential equation describing partial adjustment of the PLM parameters towards
the ALM parameters. E-stability turns out to provide the conditions for stability of an
REE under least squares and closely related learning rules.
Earlier work by (Evans and Honkapohja 2003b) showed that discretionary policy,
using interest-rate setting based on fundamentals, leads to instability because learning
by private agents fails to lead the economy to the REE corresponding to the optimal
policy without commitment. It would seem possible that the full commitment policy
implemented with (11) might perform better than discretion in this respect, because of
the feedback of the output gap on interest rates. However, we have:
Proposition 2 The fundamentals-based reaction function leads to instability under learn-
ing for all structural parameter values.
The proof is given in Appendix A.2. The source of instability lies in the interaction
between the IS curve (1) and the price setting curve (2). Some intuition is obtained by
considering a PLM (a, b, c) in which all parameters are held fixed at the optimal REE
values, except for the inflation intercept term aπ. In this case the mapping from PLM
to ALM becomes one-dimensional and takes the form
Taπ(aπ) = constant + (β + λϕ)aπ.
Since β is close to one, for most parameter values we have β+ λϕ > 1. aπ will therefore
tend to be adjusted away from the equilibrium value. Intuitively, aπ > 0 corresponds to
an exogenous positive shock to inflation expectations. This directly increases inflation
by β times the shock. In addition via (1) the inflation expectations shock lowers the real
interest rate, increasing output by ϕ times the shock, and through (2) this raises inflation
indirectly by λϕ times the shock. These revisions of expected inflation toward actual
inflation lead to a cumulative movement away from equilibrium. Under least squares
learning the dynamics are, of course, much more complicated and in particular all of
the parameters (a, b, c) adjust to forecast errors. The proof of Proposition 2 shows that
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under the fundamentals-based interest-rate policy, the system is always locally unstable,
even in the case β + λϕ < 1.12
The working paper (Evans and Honkapohja 2004) illustrates the instability result
by a simulation that shows an explosive path for the inflation rate that emerges after
about 110 periods. Other simulations for the fundamentals-based rule show a variety of
unstable paths. Of course, faced with such a path, the policymaker would alter the policy
rule and private agents would also be motivated to alter their learning rule. However,
such simulations illustrate the stability problems inherent with the fundamentals-based
rules: under this policy rule the economy will be subject to expectational instability.
In summary, under private agent learning, the policymaker’s ability to commit to
optimal policies is not suﬃcient to stabilize the economy, if the policy reaction function
is based on observable exogenous shocks and the lagged output gap in the way suggested
by the standard theory for optimal policy. We emphasize that under the fundamentals-
based rule, the problem of instability arises even if the optimal REE is determinate.
3.2 An Expectations-Based Reaction Function
The computation deriving the fundamentals-based reaction function in Section 3.1 relied
heavily on the assumption that the economy is in the optimal REE. We now obtain a
diﬀerent interest-rate reaction function, under optimal policy, which does not make
direct use of the RE assumption. Recognizing the possibility that private agents may
have non-rational expectations during the learning transition, the policy rule is obtained
by combining the optimality condition, the price-setting equation and the IS curve, for
given private expectations. This leads to a policy rule in which interest rates depend
on observed private expectations as well as on fundamentals. We call this rule the
expectations-based reaction function.
Formally, combine the price-setting equation (2) and the optimality condition (7),
treating private expectations as given. This leads to
xt =
λ
α+ λ2
hα
λ
xt−1 − βE∗t πt+1 − ut
i
.
Next, substitute this expression into the IS curve (1) and solve for it. This yields the
expectations-based reaction function for interest-rate setting:
it = δLxt−1 + δπE∗t πt+1 + δxE
∗
t xt+1 + δggt + δuut, (15)
where
δL =
−α
ϕ(α + λ2)
, δπ = 1 +
λβ
ϕ(α+ λ2)
,
δx = δg = ϕ−1, δu =
λ
ϕ(α+ λ2)
.
12An interesting question is whether instrument rules of the form it = ψxxt−1 + ψggt + ψuut yield
unstable REE under learning even when the coeﬃcients are not chosen to deliver the optimal reaction
function. It can be shown that stable (and determinate) cases do exist if 1− β2 − λϕβ > 0.
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Looking at the rule (15) it can be seen that its coeﬃcients stipulate a relatively large
response to expected inflation (δπ > 1) and that eﬀects coming from the expected output
gap and the aggregate demand shock are fully neutralized (δx = δg = ϕ−1). The positive
coeﬃcients on private expectations are crucial for ensuring stability of the REE and the
sizes of the coeﬃcients are chosen so that the economy is led to the optimal REE.
We now consider determinacy and the stability under learning for the expectations-
based reaction function (15). The reduced form of the economy under (15) isµ
xt
πt
¶
=
Ã
0 − λβ
α+λ2
0 αβα+λ2
!µ
E∗t xt+1
E∗t πt+1
¶
+ (16)µ α
α+λ2
0
αλ
α+λ2 0
¶µ
xt−1
πt−1
¶
+
µ − λα+λ2
α
α+λ2
¶
ut.
It is clearly a desirable property of our proposed monetary policy rule that it does
not permit the existence of other suboptimal stationary REE. However, as we have seen
in the case of the fundamentals-based reaction function, having a determinate REE
does not always ensure that it is attainable under learning. To analyze stability under
learning we can again use the general matrix framework in Appendix A.1.2. As in the
preceding section we endow private agents with the PLM, compute the corresponding
forecast function and substitute them into (16). This yields the temporary equilibrium
or ALM and we study whether least squares learning converges to the REE under the
expectations-based reaction function (15) by computing E-stability conditions.
The next proposition shows that our interest-rate rule performs well (see Appendix
A.2 for the formal proof).
Proposition 3 Under the expectations-based reaction function (15), the optimal REE
is both determinate and stable under learning for all structural parameter values.
The key to our stability results is that monetary authorities raise interest rates, ceteris
paribus, in response to increases in inflation and output forecasts by private agents, and
lower interest rates in response to decreases in private expectations. Some intuition can
be gained from the reduced form (16). An increase in inflation expectations now leads
to an increase in actual inflation that is smaller than the change in expectations since
αβ/(α+λ2) < 1. This dampened eﬀect arises from the interest-rate reaction to changes
in E∗t πt+1 and is a crucial element of the stability result.
The results of Proposition 3 can also viewed in a diﬀerent way. Under (15), the
optimality condition (7) is satisfied for all possible expectations. Thus, the reduced
form (16) is obtainable directly from (7) and (2), and it is a Corollary that the specific
targeting rule (7), advocated e.g. by (Svensson 2003), is determinate and stable under
learning for all parameter values. The point of Proposition 3 is precisely to show how
implementation of (7) can be achieved using an interest-rate reaction function.
In summary, Proposition 3 provides a remarkably strong result: the reaction function
(15) passes both of the performance tests we earlier set forth. These positive results show
that the (Evans and Honkapohja 2003b) analysis of optimal discretionary policy can be
extended to implement optimal policy with commitment.
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4 Discussion
Thus far we have treated expectations as determined before the current values of en-
dogenous variables are realized, as is evident from (14). This would be natural if agents
obtain these forecasts from an econometric forecasting firm prior to entering the market
place. We briefly consider an alternative possibility that allows forecasts to be functions
also of the current values of endogenous variables, so that
E∗t yt+1 = at + btyt + ctFvt.
This means that current decisions and forecasts of the agents are simultaneously
determined. Private agents must now be regarded as entering the market place with
the most recent estimates of the forecast functions (obtained from the forecasting firm),
which are incorporated into the consumption and pricing plans. We remark that this
stronger information assumption gives additional scope to monetary policy, since changes
in interest rates will also have an immediate indirect eﬀect on expectations.
Indeterminacy under the fundamentals-based reaction function is, of course, not af-
fected since this is a property of the model under RE. Stability under learning can in
general be aﬀected by the alternative information assumption. It turns out that under
the alternative information assumption and the fundamentals-based reaction function
there are parameter regions in which the model is stable under learning and other pa-
rameter regions in which it is unstable under learning. Instability arises for suﬃciently
small values of α. For example, for the MN calibration the borderline is approximately
α = 1.830. In contrast, we continue to have stability under the expectations-based
reaction function. See (Evans and Honkapohja 2004) for details and the proof.
Proposition 4 Under the alternative information assumption and the expectations-
based reaction function (15), the optimal REE is stable under learning for all structural
parameter values.
Several further points should be made concerning our results. First, although we have
demonstrated our results in the context of least squares learning, the stability results
will obtain under various generalizations of least squares.13 In fact, the stability results
for the expectations-based reaction function hold even for some forecast rules that do
not converge to RE. This is true, for example, if private agents forecast both output and
prices using simple adaptive expectations rules.
There are two potential limitations to implementing policy using our expectations-
based rule.14 One limitation is that high-quality contemporaneous observations of ex-
pectations may not be available. One possible way of dealing with this problem would
be to construct proxies for private expectations. The central bank might then employ
forecasts based on recursive VARs, i.e. use the same procedure that we are assuming is
13See e.g. the weighting schemes in (Marcet and Sargent 1989) and inertial behavior in (Evans,
Honkapohja, and Marimon 2001).
14For further discussion and formal details, see (Evans and Honkapohja 2003a).
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used by private agents. This procedure can achieve convergence under plausible auxil-
iary assumptions even if their priors diﬀer. A second limitation is the assumption that
the coeﬃcients of the structural model (1) and (2) are known to the policymaker. For
discretionary policy (Evans and Honkapohja 2003b) showed for an expectations-based
policy implemented using estimated structural parameters that the REE remains locally
stable under simultaneous learning by private agents and policymakers. An analogous
argument can be made in the current case of optimal policy with commitment.
Finally, we remark that (Jensen and McCallum 2002) have recently shown that modi-
fying the optimality condition (7) to λπt = −α(xt−βxt−1) appears to improve the policy
performance, because it partially compensates for the timeless perspective neglect of the
first period optimality condition. Fundamentals- and expectations-based reaction func-
tions can be derived corresponding to this modified optimality condition. It can be
shown that our stability and instability results remain unchanged.
5 Alternative Policy Rules
The fundamentals-based rule (11) is specified in terms of lagged output. One might
wonder whether stability can be achieved if the rule were expressed in terms of the lagged
price level. The commitment optimality condition (7) can be written as λ(pt − pt−1) =
−α(xt−xt−1), where pt is the log of the price level. This will be satisfied if xt = −λαpt+k,
for any constant k. It can be verified that the optimal REE satisfies
pt = b¯xpt−1 + c¯put + a¯p
xt = b¯ppt−1 + c¯xut + a¯x,
for appropriate parameters with b¯x as before. Following the earlier procedures, one can
obtain an alternative fundamentals-based reaction function of the form
it = ηppt−1 + ϕ
−1gt + ηuut + η0.
It can be shown that the optimal REE leads to instability when ϕ > λα .
15
Above we chose our recommended rule carefully to ensure both determinacy and sta-
bility under learning for all parameter values. In the literature alternative interest-rate
rules have appeared, which can be interpreted as expectations-based reaction functions
but which do not meet our tests. Consider the interest-rate reaction function
it = (1−
λ
αϕ
)Etπt+1 + ϕ−1gt
suggested in (Clarida, Gali, and Gertler 1999), Section 4.2.2. Replacing Etπt+1 with
E∗t πt+1 leads to a policy reaction function based in part on observed expectations. This
policy rule is consistent with the optimal policy under commitment under the RE as-
sumption. However, this reaction function can lead to indeterminacy, and furthermore
if β + λ2/α > 1 the optimal REE is not stable under learning.
15Formal details are available in the working paper version (Evans and Honkapohja 2004).
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(McCallum and Nelson 2004) have recently suggested that, in place of interest-rate
setting by a reaction function satisfying the optimality condition (7), there are well
performing instrument rules that can approximate (7). These instrument rules specify
that the interest rate is moved towards a specified target value in response to deviations
from commitment optimality. To begin, consider instrument rules of the form
it = πt + θ[πt + (α/λ)(xt − xt−1)], θ > 0. (17)
We will call this the approximate targeting rule. Numerical results (details are given
in the working paper version) indicate that under (17) the steady state seems to be
determinate and stable under learning for all values of α and θ.
As pointed out by (McCallum and Nelson 2004), a diﬃculty with the approximate
targeting rule (17) is that it presupposes that the policymaker can observe current output
gap and inflation when setting it. If neither xt nor πt are observable at t, they find that
a forward-looking version performs best under RE, e.g.
it = E˜tπt+1 + θ[E˜tπt+1 + (α/λ)(E˜txt+1 − E˜txt)], (18)
where E˜t(.) denotes the expectations of the policymaker. Suppose that the expectations
of the policymaker are formed like those of private agents. Determinacy and learnability
for the rule (18) now depend on the values of the parameters. As an illustration we
consider the CGG calibration. Determinacy obtains for suﬃciently small values of the
reaction parameter θ, but larger values θ > θˆ lead to indeterminacy. Correspondingly,
learning stability obtains for suﬃciently small values of θ, while larger values θ > θ¯ can
destabilize the economy. The boundaries θˆ and θ¯ depend on the model parameters and,
in particular, on the degree of flexibility α in inflation targeting. This is illustrated in
Table 1. We remark that for θˆ < θ < θ¯ we have stability but indeterminacy.
Table 1. Critical values θˆ, θ¯ for indeterminacy and instability
α 0.01 0.05 0.1 0.5 1.0 2.0
indeterminacy 1.643 0.365 0.185 0.037 0.019 0.009
instability 3.495 0.413 0.197 0.038 0.019 0.009
Restricting θ to be relatively small to achieve stability is problematic since, under RE,
rules with a small value of θ imply that deviations from optimality lead to only small
corrections towards meeting the optimality condition. In some cases, the welfare losses
can be substantial when one restricts θ to values consistent with stability.16
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper has analyzed determinacy and stability under learning for alternative interest-
rate reaction functions that aim to implement optimal monetary policy under commit-
ment. Determinacy is desirable because it implies that there do not exist other (nonop-
timal) REE near the solution of interest. Stability under learning is desirable because
16For further details see (Evans and Honkapohja 2004) and (Evans and Honkapohja 2003a).
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it indicates that if private agents follow least squares learning they will converge over
time to the optimal REE. These are independent criteria, as is evident from our results
in Sections 3.1 and 5.
Our analysis leads to the conclusion that the two desiderata are met by a policy
that sets interest rates according to our expectations-based reaction function. In this
monetary policy reaction function, interest rates respond to private expectations as well
as to fundamentals, i.e., exogenous shocks and the lagged output gap. This interest-rate
reaction function unambiguously delivers both determinacy and stability under learning
for the economy, with the economy converging over time to the optimal REE.
In contrast, the fundamentals-based formulation does not perform well and problems
with both indeterminacy and instability under learning arise. The dependence on the
lagged output gap implied by commitment is not suﬃcient to guarantee convergence
under learning when interest-rate setting is based solely on fundamentals.
We also discussed alternative policy rules that aim to implement optimal policy. With
the exception of the approximate targeting rule using contemporaneous information on
inflation and output gap, which is questionable from the viewpoint of operationality, all
of the alternatives examined had problems with determinacy and stability under learn-
ing. More generally, we reiterate that in monetary policy design expectations must be
treated as subject to deviations from rational expectations with private agents following
a natural econometric forecasting procedure. Optimal policy should be designed so that
under private agent learning the economy is guided to the REE.
A Appendices
A.1 Stability Under Learning, General Methodology
A.1.1 Temporary Equilibrium
The starting point for models of adaptive learning is that agents have less information
than is presumed under RE. Instead, private agents optimize using subjective (possibly
non-rational) probability distributions over future variables. Given these subjective
distributions, the standard Euler equations provide necessary conditions for optimal
decisions, and we assume that the Euler equations for the current period specify the
behavioral rule that gives current decisions as functions of the expected state next period.
These Euler equations are then supplemented by rules for forecasting next period’s values
of the state variables. Thus, given their forecasts, agents make decisions for the current
period according to the Euler equations. This kind of behavior is boundedly rational
but, in our view, reasonable, since agents are attempting to make optimal decisions
based on a perceived law of motion for the state variables.17
17Recently, (Preston 2002) has studied standard instrument rules for monetary policy when agents
have a diﬀerent behavioral rule in which long-horizon forecasts matter. The E-stability conditions
appear to be unchanged. See (Honkapohja, Mitra, and Evans 2002) for further discussion.
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For the model at hand we give a detailed discussion making use of the general equilib-
rium framework presented in (Woodford 1996). Although we maintain the representative
agent assumption, so that agents have identical expectations and make the same deci-
sions, it will be useful to let i index individual firms or households. Consider first the
Phillips curve (2). Let P it be the price being set by those firms that can do so, Pt the
average price index and Pˆ it the deviation of the relative price Pit/Pt from its stationary
value. Woodford shows that Pˆ it can be expressed as a linear function of current output
and discounted sums of expected future outputs and inflations. This derivation can be
viewed as using subjective expectations that need not be rational. Assuming that the
law of iterated expectations holds at the level of the individual agent, quasi-diﬀerencing
allows us to express Pˆ it as a linear function of Ei∗t Pˆ it+1, xt and Ei∗t πt+1, where of course
Ei∗t denotes the expectation of firm i. However, Pˆ it+1 = Pˆt+1 and there is a proportional
relationship between inflation and Pˆt. Firms will thus observe from the data that Pˆ it is
exactly proportional to πt, and thus Pˆ it can be rewritten as a linear function of expected
inflation Ei∗t πt+1 and current output xt.
18 This defines the optimal price-setting sched-
ule for P it , as a function of Pt, xt and Ei∗t πt+1, which firms take to the market place.
In addition, we allow for an exogenous shock ut to the price-setting schedule. In the
temporary equilibrium, with identical firms and homogeneous forecasts and using again
the relationship between Pˆt and inflation, we obtain (2).
Consider next the IS curve (1). The linearized Euler equation, which is standard, is
given by cit = E
i∗
t c
i
t+1 − ϕ(it −Ei∗t πt+1).19 (Government purchases are assumed to enter
the utility function in an additively separable way.) Although cit+1 will be determined by
the household itself, a forecast is required to determine its optimal current consumption.
Let ξt denote the proportion of government purchases in GDP, and let ξˆt = − ln(1− ξt).
From market clearing cit = ct = xt− ξˆt. Assume households observe from past data that
cit = xt − ξˆt and make use of this relationship for forecasting their future consumption.
For convenience, assume that ξˆt follows a known AR(1) process ξˆt = µξˆt−1 + ξ˜t. Then
Ei∗t c
i
t+1 = E
i∗
t xt+1 − Ei∗t ξt+1, which leads to the consumption schedule
cit = E
i∗
t xt+1 − ϕ(it − Ei∗t πt+1)− µξˆt
submitted to the market place. Assuming that the government comes to the market place
with its plan to purchase proportion ξt of output, we obtain (1), where gt = (1− µ)ξˆt,
in temporary equilibrium with identical households and homogeneous forecasts.
Given private expectations, these schedules together with the monetary policy rule
determine a temporary equilibrium according to (1)-(2). Thus the values of πt, xt and it
are simultaneously determined through market clearing, in the usual way, by the pricing
and consumption schedules. To complete the description of the temporary equilibrium,
we must specify how expectations are formed. The main case considered in the text
assumes that expectations are functions only of lagged endogenous variables and ob-
servable current shocks and are thus predetermined when the plans are brought to the
18We are making the simplifying assumption that potential output is constant so that output can be
identified with xt. This assumption is easily relaxed.
19See e.g. (McCallum and Nelson 1999) or (Woodford 1996).
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market. This would be natural if forecasts were obtained from an econometric forecast-
ing firm before going to the market place. In the alternative information assumption
mentioned in Section 4, the agents instead obtain forecasting functions from the firm
and plug in observations of current endogenous variables at the market place, so that
πt, xt, it and the forecasts are all simultaneously determined.
The temporary equilibrium for the current period provides a new data point for
the agents. Given this new data, the forecast functions are updated at the start of
the following period using least squares. The stability question is whether this kind of
(adaptive) learning behavior converges over time to REE of interest.
A.1.2 Stability Conditions
When agents adjust their forecast functions over time, the dynamics of the economy
is mathematically specified by a stochastic recursive algorithm, which is a special type
of nonlinear time varying stochastic system. The conditions for convergence of such
dynamics are formally obtained from the local stability conditions of an associated or-
dinary diﬀerential equation.20 The latter conditions are in turn governed by what are
called expectational or E-stability conditions. (Evans and Honkapohja 2001) provides
an extensive analysis of adaptive learning and its implications in macroeconomics (see
also the other references in footnote 1). In this paper we simply present the E-stability
conditions for a general matrix model
yt = A+ME∗t yt+1 +QE
∗
t yt +Nyt−1 + Pvt, (19)
vt = Fvt−1 + v˜t,
where v˜t is multivariate white noise. This setup is suﬃciently general to cover all rules
considered in the paper. Usually either Q = 0 or N = 0.
For (19) with N 6= 0 the REE of interest take the form yt = a¯+ b¯yt−1+ c¯vt. To define
E-stability we consider PLMs
yt = a+ byt−1 + cvt.
Using the methods of Chapter 10 of (Evans and Honkapohja 2001), for (19) the mapping
from PLM to ALM is given by
T (a, b, c) = (A+ (Q+M(I + b))a,Mb2 +Qb+N,Qc+M(bc+ cF ) + P ).
The E-stability conditions can be stated in terms of the derivative matrices
DTa = Q+M(I + b¯) (20)
DTb = b¯0 ⊗M + I ⊗Mb¯+ I ⊗Q (21)
DTc = F 0 ⊗M + I ⊗Mb¯+ I ⊗Q, (22)
where ⊗ denotes the Kronecker product and b¯ denotes the REE value of b.
20This approach was first exploited in a learning context by (Marcet and Sargent 1989).
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Remark 5 The necessary and suﬃcient conditions for E-stability are that all eigenval-
ues of DTa − I, DTb − I and DTc − I have negative real parts.21
When N = 0, the MSV solution takes the form
yt = a+ hvt,
where in the REE the coeﬃcients satisfy a = (M + Q)a and h = MhF + Qh + P .
E-stability conditions now require that the eigenvalues of the matrices
DTa − I = M +Q− I
DTh − I = F 0 ⊗M + I ⊗Q− I
have negative real parts.
A.2 Derivations
To assess determinacy we write the system as


xt
πt
xLt

 = J


xt+1
πt+1
xLt+1

+ other, (23)
where xLt ≡ xt−1. Since there is one predetermined variable, determinacy holds when J
has two eigenvalues inside and one outside the unit circle.
Proof of Proposition 1. From the reduced form (12) we obtain
J =


0 0 1
0 β λ
(ϕψx)−1 ψx−1 −(ϕψx)−1

 .
Straightforward numerical calculations for the calibrated example show that two eigen-
values of J lie outside the unit circle, and one lies inside, for small values of α, so that the
steady state is indeterminate, while for larger values of α exactly one root lies outside
the unit circle, and the model is determinate. We remark that continuity of eigenvalues
implies that both regions contain open sets of parameters.
Proof of Proposition 2. We apply the E-stability conditions above in Appendix
A.1.2, when the general model (19) takes the specific form (12). In this case Q = 0 and
M =
µ
1 ϕ
λ β + λϕ
¶
, N =
µ
−ϕψx 0
−λϕψx 0
¶
and P =
µ
0 −ϕψu
0 1− λϕψu
¶
.
In the E-stability conditions (20)-(22), the condition for b is independent of the
other variables, while the conditions for a and c are dependent on b but not on each
21We are excluding the exceptional cases where one or more eigenvalue has zero real part.
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other. Because of this recursive structure, a necessary condition for stability is that
DTa− I, evaluated at the REE, has eigenvalues with negative real parts. This condition
is equivalent to tr(DTa − I) < 0 and det(DTa − I) > 0.
Using the notation b = (bij), j = 1, 2 and evaluating variables at the REE, we have
b11 = b¯x, b21 = b¯π and b12 = b22 = 0. The coeﬃcient matrix for a in (20) for the reduced
form (12) has the explicit form
DTa − I =
µ
b¯x + ϕb¯π ϕ
λ(b¯x + 1) + (β + λϕ)b¯π (β + λϕ)− 1
¶
. (24)
The determinant of the coeﬃcient matrix (24) is (β−1)b¯x−ϕb¯π−λϕ < 0 since 0 < β < 1
and λ, ϕ, b¯x and b¯π > 0. The result follows.
Proof of Proposition 3. From the reduced form (16) we obtain
J =


0 0 1
0 β λ
0 βλα
α+λ2
α

 .
The roots of J are 0 and (2α)−1
µ
α+ αβ + λ2 ±
q
(α+ αβ + λ2)2 − 4α2β
¶
. The nonzero
roots are real and positive, with one root less than one and the other root larger than
one. Since exactly two roots are inside the unit circle, determinacy follows.
Turning to E-stability, we have
DTb − I =


−βλb¯π
α+λ2
− 1 −βλb¯x
α+λ2
0 0
αβb¯π
α+λ2
αβb¯x
α+λ2 − 1 0 0
0 0 −1 0
0 0 0 −1

 , (25)
DTc − I =


−λβb¯π
α+λ2
− 1 − λβρ
α+λ2
0 0
αβb¯π
α+λ2
αβρ
α+λ2 − 1 0 0
0 0 −1 0
0 0 0 −1

 , (26)
DTa − I =
Ã
−βλb¯π
α+λ2 − 1
−βλ
α+λ2
αβb¯π
α+λ2
αβ
α+λ2 − 1
!
. (27)
DTb − I has two eigenvalues equal to −1. The remaining two eigenvalues are those
of the 2 × 2 matrix in the top left corner of DTb − I . The trace of this 2 × 2 matrix
is (α + λ2)−1(−βλb¯π + αβb¯x) − 2, which is negative since the only positive term is less
than one. Its determinant is (α+ λ2)−1(βλb¯π − αβb¯x) + 1, which is positive as the only
negative term is less than one absolute value (since β < 1 and 0 < b¯x < 1). Thus, all of
the eigenvalues of (25) have negative real parts.
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The matrix (26) has two eigenvalues equal to −1 and the remaining two are those of
the 2×2matrix in the top left corner. The trace of this 2×2matrix is (α+λ2)−1(−βλb¯π+
αβρ) − 2. The only positive term (if ρ > 0) is less than one and so the trace is always
negative. (If ρ < 0, all terms are negative.) Its determinant is (α+λ2)−1(βλb¯π−αβρ)+1
and the only (possibly) negative term is less than one and so the determinant is positive.
Thus DTc − I is a stable matrix. Finally, we note that the top left 2 × 2 matrix with
ρ = 1 is identical to the matrix (27), so that the latter is also a stable matrix.
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